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Discovery-Disclosure of Existence and Policy
Limits of Liability Insurance*
The courts disagree about whether a plaintiff in a negligence
action should be allowed discovery of the existence and policy
limits of a defendant's liability insurance.' Where a definite relationship between the provisions of the policy and the issues in dispute
can be clearly shown, courts generally agree that discovery should
be permitted.2 Morever, the presence of this relationship will mean
that the discovered material will be admissible in evidence at trial.3
Examples of the relationship between policy provisions and the
issues in dispute are the relationship of the parties, ownership of
property," and the defendant's previous accidents."
The conflict in the decisions centers upon the situation in which
a plaintiff seeks to discover the existence and amount of a defendant's liability insurance and yet the fact of insurance would not be
admissible in evidence at trial. The typical situation in which the
problem arises is the automobile accident. The injured plaintiff,
moving under the appropriate discovery statute,7 propounds ques*N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(26) (1953); Cook v. Welty, 10 Fed. Rules Serv.
2d 26b.31-1, Case 1 (D.D.C. May 11, 1966).
1. Discovery of liability insurance allowed: Furumizo v. United States, 33 F.R.D.
18 (D. Hawaii 1963); Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64 (D.N.J. 1961); Novak v. Good
Will Grange No. 127, 28 F.R.D. 394 (D. Conn. 1961); Jobanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D.
272 (D. Mont. 1961) ; Schwentner v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mont. 1961);
Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., 12 F.R.D. 4 (D. Tenn. 1951); Lucas v. Dist.
Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959) ; People v. Fisher, 12 II1. 2d 231, 145
N.E.2d 588 (1957) ; Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d (Ky. 1954).
Discovery of liability insurance not allowed: Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476
D.N.J. 1962); Langlois v. Allen, 30 F.R.D. 67 (D. Conn. 1962) ; Hooker v. Raytheon
Co., 31 F.R.D. 120 (D. Cal. 1962) ; Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (D. Tenn.
1962) ; Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (D. 11. 1958) ; Flynn v. Williams, 30
F.R.D. 66 (D. Conn. 1958) ; Di Pietruntonio v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 291, 327
P.2d 746 (1958); Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955) ; Bean
v. Best, 76 S.D. 462, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957) ; State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court,
69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952).
2. American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Richard Gibson & Sons, 1 F.R.D. 501 (D.
Mass. 1940) ; Layton v. Cregan & Mallory, 263 Mich. 30, 240 N.W. 539 (1933);
Martyn v. Braun, 270 App. Div. 768, 59 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1946) ; see Comment, 26
Cornell L.Q. 137 (1940).
3. McCormick, Evidence § 168 (1954).
4. Plyler v. Gordon, 25 F.R.D. 170 (D.N.J. 1960).
5. McDowell Associates v. Pennsylvania R.R., 142 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
6. Roth v. Bird, 239 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1956).
7. The New Mexico Civil Procedure Rules, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-1-1(26) to (37)
(1953), are the discovery mechanisms, which are substantially the same as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A party may request discovery of the defendant's
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tions to the defendant, asking if he carries liability insurance and
the extent of the coverage. The defendant declines to answer on the
grounds that the queries are irrelevant.
About half 8 the courts hold that the existence of liability insurance is irrelevant to the negligence issue and therefore deny discovery of the policy; the others' reason that liability insurance is
relevant to the "subject matter" of the action and therefore permit
its discovery. The New Mexico courts have not decided this
question.' Yet, with the increased volume of automobile negligence
cases" and the increase in the number of vehicles, the New Mexico
courts will inevitably be faced with the problem.
The subject of the conflict is the proper construction of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), which is substantially the same as
section 21-1-1 (26) (b) of the New Mexico statutes.' 2 The rule
provides:
Unless otherwise ordered by the court as provided by Rule 30 (b)
or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the

examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party,
insurance by interrogatory under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (33) (1953) ; request the
production of the insurance policy under N.M. Stat. Ann § 21-1-1 (34) (1953) ; or
ask during oral deposition of the existence and policy limits under N.M. Stat. Ann. §
21-1-1(26)(b) (1953).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(34) (1953), provides that a party may discover documents
"which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the
scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26 (b) .... "
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(33) (1953), provides: "Interrogatories may relate to any
matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26 (b) .... .
Therefore, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (26) (b) (1953), is the pertinent rule. The
rule is set forth in the text accompanying note 13.
8. See note 1 supra; see also 9 Federation of Insurance Counsil Q. 58 (1958),
where the constitutional objection to discovery of insurance coverage is discussed.
This issue has generally been disregarded.
9. Ibid.
10. Neither has the Tenth Circuit nor the Federal District Court for New
Mexico decided this issue.
11. In recent years personal injury suits comprised 60% of all new issues filed
in the New York Supreme Court. It is estimated that each year in New York City
about 193,000 claimants seek compensation for injuries arising out of someone else's
negligence. About 162,000 of these cases end in ultimate recovery of judgement.
Negligence cases are the greatest single source of log jam in the trial courts of
New York with excessive delay becoming a major problem.
In the federal courts in 1958, 49% of all civil cases were personal injury actions.
For further information concerning the increase and delay in personal injury cases
see Rosenburg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation,
59 Colum L. Rev. 1115 (1959), from which the previous information was taken.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1(26) (b) (1953).
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including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and

location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts.
It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible
at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Since no question of insurance as privileged material has been
raised, 13 the policy's relevance to the subject matter becomes the
first critical question in determining whether to allow or refuse its
discovery. Early federal decisions interpreting the rule held that
the information sought from the defendant must be evidence which
would be admissible at trial.' 4 Some courts persist in denying disclosure of a policy on the ground that such inquiry was not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence that would be
admissible on the issues raised by the pleadings.' 5 However, in
1948 a specific amendment to rule 26(b) added the last sentence
to the rule; the amendment makes clear the latitude which was to
be accorded to the rule. The added language was not intended to
limit the proposition, stated in the rule, that information relevant
to the subjejct matter may be obtained by discovery.' Since the
1948 amendment, it seems that the greater number of courts use
as the standard, relevancy to the "subject matter," not admissibility
of the evidence at trial. 7 Thus, the federal court in Kaiser-Fraser
Corp v. Otis & Co. said:
'Relevant' as used in Section 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., is not to be equated with 'relevant' as
ordinarily used in determining admissibility of evidence upon a

trial. This is clear from the very rule which permits the examination
of any party or person . . . 'regarding any matter, not privileged,

which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of any other
party .

. . .'

Thus it is relevancy to the subject matter which is the

13. Comment, 17 S.C.L.Q. 750, 751 (1965).
14. E.g., Benevento v. A.&P. Food Stores, 26 F. Supp. 424 (E.D.N.Y. 1939);
Poppino v. Jones Store, 1 F.R.D. 215 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
15. E.g., Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958); see also State
ex rel. Bush v. Elliott, 363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1963) ; McClure v. Boeger, 105 F.Supp.
612 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
16. Lucas v. Dist. Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959). The contrary view
is stated in 3A Baron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, p. 456 (Rev. ed.
1961).
17. See 2A Baron & Holtzoff, op. cit. supra note 16, at § 647.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 7

test and subject matter is broader than the precise issues presented
by the pleadings.'

Drawing the line about what is relevant to the subject matter
involved in an action is obviously very difficult.'" Yet, the requirement of relevancy should be construed broadly and with common
sense, not in terms of narrow legalisms. 20 Indeed, a sound interpre-

tation of rule 26(b) would permit discovery where there is any
possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the
subject matter of the action. Some courts, 21 while using the recommended liberal concept of relevancy, still refuse to permit discovery
of liability insurance by giving the term "subject matter" a doctrinal
and narrow construction. Gallimore v. Dye,22 a federal case involving interrogatories seeking to discover policy limits, is an example
of the reasoning that opposes discovery of such material. The
court in Gallimore pointed out that the rules limited discovery to
matters which are relevant to the subject matter of the action or are
reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of matters which are
relevant to the subject matter. The answer to the propounded interrogatory would do neither. The court, concluding that the "subject
matter" was nothing other than the charge of negligence against
the defendant which caused injury to the plaintiff, held that the
23
answer to the propounded interrogatory was therefore irrelevant.
The Gallimore court's reasoning is not incorrect as a matter of
strict logic and is based on the strongest argument yet advanced for
denying discovery of liability insurance. If the "subject matter"
is only the charge of negligence against the defendant, it is obvious
that information concerning liability insurance coverage is irrelevant
to that issue.
But are the purposes of discovery merely to obtain evidence to
be introduced at the trial, to secure information about where such
evidence may be found, and to narrow the issues to be tried? Is the
"subject matter" of a personal injury action arising out of an
automobile accident the issue of negligence alone?
The recent federal case of Cook v. Welty 24 gave well-reasoned
answers to the above questions. The action was brought to recover
18. 11 F.R.D. 50, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). (Emphasis added.)
19. 2A Baron & Holtzoff, op. cit supra note 16, at § 647.
20. Ibid.
21. E.g., Bean v. Best, 76 S.D. 462, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957).
22. 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. I1. 1958); see also Jeppesen v. Swanson, 242 Minn. 547,
68 N.W.2d 649 (1955) ; Mecke v. Bahr, 177 Neb. 584, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964).
23. Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
24. Cook v. Welty, 10 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 26b.31-1, Case 1 (D.D.C. May 11, 1966).
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damages for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident.
The owner and operator of the vehicle involved in the accident
died subsequent to its occurrence, and the suit was instituted against
the administratrix of his estate. The defendant's depostion was
taken with questions asked about what, if any, liability insurance had
been carried by the deceased, and the limitations and extent of the
coverage. The defendant refused to answer and the matter came
before the court on a motion to compel her to respond. (It was
stipulated at the argument that a similiar question would arise if
interrogatories had been served covering the same subject matter.)
The court held that a plaintiff in an action for negligence should be
granted discovery either by depostion or interrogatories concerning
the existence and extent of the defendant's liability insurance
coverage.25
The first argument advanced by Cook is that the federal rules
should not be limited to narrowing the issues for trial, but should
also aid the parties in private settlement. 26 The opinion rejects
as too narrow a view the Gallimore argument which limits discovery
to obtaining evidence to be introduced at trial.2 7 Rule I of the Federal Rules 28 declares that the rules shall be construed to "secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Judge
Holtzoff states in the Cook decision that "information concerning
liability insurance and the extent of its coverage is conducive to
fair negotiations and to just settlements. ' 29 It seems reasonable to
equate methods and procedures which encourage and facilitate
settlement with a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."
Certain courts have expressed the view that settlement is not the
aim of the discovery rules.30 They reason that the rules were not
intended to supply information which has no connection with the
determination of the issues at trial however desirable it may be to
expedite settlement, thus relieving calendar congestion. Moreover,
granting that the discovery rules are to be liberally construed to
accomplish their general purpose, it must be realized that they have
certain limitations and boundaries that the courts cannot ignore.
Have not those courts refusing to permit discovery of an insur25.
26.
27.
22 and
28.
29.
30.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill.
1958). See text accompanying notes
23 supra.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
10 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 26b.31-2, Case 1 (D.D.C. May 11, 1966).
E.g., Bisserier v. Manning, 270 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D.N.J. 1962).
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ance policy misconstrued the limitations and boundaries of the discovery rules? Are not the objectives and purposes of modern discovery rules to eliminate secrecy, mystery, and surprise? The
"sporting theory of justice" has been rejected." "The central notion
of the discovery practice set out in the rules is that the right to take
statements and the right to use them in court must be kept entirely
distinct. ' 3 2 By this method, discovery at the pre-trial state is not
fettered with the rules about admissibility which apply at trial.
Restrictions on the use of products of discovery are imposed at
trial which greatly eliminates delay at the pre-trial stage. The rules
have many objectives yet,
Without minimizing the importance of any of the other objectives
which the new rules will seek to attain, it seems safe to say that the
ultimate success of the rules will be measured or judged more by the
extent to which they eliminate delay than by any other single
83
factor.
Discovery rules were designed to eliminate delay. They are the
procedural tools to effectuate the prompt and just disposition of
litigation by allowing the parties in advance of trial to appraise the
34
real value of their claims and defenses.
If settlement negotiations are reasonably a part of the judicial
process which should be guided by the court rules, does disclosure of
policy limits in fact facilitate settlement? Will knowledge of the
defendant's insurance coverage permit a more realistic appraisal
of a case and lead to the settlement of cases which would otherwise
go to trial? Cook answers affirmatively in a second argument for
allowing discovery of a policy. In cases where injuries are very
great, but insurance coverage low, and the defendant is otherwise
impecunious, the plaintiff might well be led to accept a smaller
settlement than the extent of his injuries would otherwise warrant.
On the other hand, where the limits of the insurance policy are
high, "there appears to be no fair reason for refraining to disclose
such information to plaintiff's counsel. '3 5 Yet, some cases hold that
allowing discovery of liability insurance coverage places the plaintiff in a more strategic position than he would have been without
31. Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958).
32. Wright, Federal Courts § 81, at 308 (1963).
33. Address by the Honorable H. Church Ford, "More Expeditious Determination
of Actions Under The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," March 30, 1939, in
1 F.R.D. 223.
34. People v. Fisher, 2 I1. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1957).
35. 10 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 26b.31-2, Case 1 (D.D.C. May 11, 1966).
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discovery. 6 The Cook court was unable to perceive any disadvantage that would result to the defendant,
except perhaps purely as a matter of tactics, which would not
necessarily be conducive to a just disposition of the litigation.
Refusal to require disclosure would help perpetuate 'the sporting
theory of justice.' It is 3one of the objectives of modern reformed
procedure to eliminate it. 7
Irrespective of coverage, just compensation should be given for
injuries, and if the parties cannot agree on a settlement figure, the
jury (without knowledge of policy limits because it would not be
admissible in evidence) 38 will resolve the issue for them. If the
plaintiff has been injured to the extent of 12,000 dollars, this figure
would not be increased because the defendant had 100,000 dollars
of coverage. To say that it would is to seriously question the ethics
and good judgment of the plaintiff's counsel and the value of the
jury system-topics which are clearly beyond the scope of this
Comment. 9
A third reason Cook advances for allowing discovery of liability
insurance is that by facilitating settlement, discovery of insurance
effectuates the dispatch of the court's business. Experience shows
that dockets of the courts, especially those in metropolitan centers,
are crowded with negligence cases, the majority of cases arising
from automobile accidents.40 Most of these cases are disposed of
without a trial.4 The courts, especially in metropolitan areas, would
36. E.g., Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957) ; but see the dissent by Justice
Drew:
I can see no harm which will come from requiring a defendant to disclose
the limits and conditions of the policy of insurance which he carries for the
obvious benefit of the injured party. Moreover in negotiations or litigation
both sides should have access to all the facts. The administration of justice
should not be a game of hide and seek. One party should not be blindfolded
in negotiating a settlement or a compromise. It is a fundamental concept that
both sides should have all the facts in the settlement of disputes and this can
never be achieved unless some method is provided by requiring the full disclosure by a process which will afford protection to the party entering into a
settlement of the terms and extent of liability insurance policies.
Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693, 701 (Fla. 1957). See also Jeppesen v. Swanson, 242
Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955); Mecke v. Bahr, 177 Neb. 584, 129 N.W.2d 573
(1964).
37. 10 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 26b.31-2, Case 1 (D.D.C. May 11, 1966).
38. Id. at p. 26b.31-2.
39. For a complete discussion on the jury system see, Busch, 1 Law and Tactics in
Jury Trials 13 (1959) ; Meagner, Trial by Jury Deserves a Fair Trial, 36 N.Y.S.B.J.

303 (1964).

40. See Rosenburg & Sovern, supra note 11.
41. Id. at 1121.
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be confronted with an impossible task if a majority of cases were
actually tried, instead of being either settled or dismissed. Judge
Holtzoff points out that if most cases had to be tried, it would be
necessary to expand courtroom facilities and increase the number of
judges perhaps several times the present personnel.4 2 But excessive
delay is also rooted in unrealistic and ineffective work methods.
In an address to the American Bar Association Chief Justice
Warren stated that there is greater promise in better techniques
than in more judges: "We cannot expect our strength to flow merely
from expanding the judiciary .... Our strength must come mainly
from improved methods .. . ."' Allowing discovery of liability
insurance is a method that effectuates the dispatch of a majority of
docketed cases. The court's appreciation of the congested condition
of dockets and the resulting delay in justice was certainly a prime
consideration in allowing discovery of liability insurance in Cook:
Judicial administration comprises much more than merely trying
cases one by one as they are reached. The court must also deal with
dockets as a whole. It is in the interest of the administration of
justice as well as beneficial to individual litigants from their personal

standpoint that as many cases as possible be amicably adjusted without a trial,44 provided that this result can be reached on a fair and
open basis.
Aside from the reasoning previously discussed, Cook mentions the
numerous other arguments for allowing discovery of liability insurance which other courts have advanced.
Litigation in automobile negligence cases is a practical business.
One of the first questions that the claimant in an accident asks is:
"Do you have insurance-how much"? He is faced with medical
bills, loss of earning power, property damage, and possibly the
death of a loved one. The claimant reasons that liability insurance
exists for one purpose-to pay his legitimate claims.
The Cook decision shows that the courts have started to follow
this kind of reasoning, recognizing that where insurance coverage
exists, the insurer takes control of the defense of the insured. The
insurer defends the suit, investigates the accident, and negotiates
settlement. This fact may properly be considered in determining
whether the plaintiff should be permitted discovery relative to
42. Cook v. Welty, 10 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 26b.31-1, Case 1 (D.D.C. May 11, 1966).
43. Warren, The Problem of Delay; "A Task for Bench and Bar Alike," 44
A.B.A.J. 1043, 1046 (1958).
44. 10 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 26b.31-2, Case I (D.D.C. May 11, 1966) ; see also
Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272, 278 (D. Mont. 1961).
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insurance information,45 that is, to determine who is the real
adversary. Courts have also concluded that since the question of
insurance was relevant to the subject matter after the plaintiff
prevailed,46 it was relevant while the action was pending. 47 These
decisions hold that:
an insurance contract is no longer a secret, private, confidential

arrangement between insurance carrier and the individual, but it
is an agreement that embraces those whose 4person
or property may
8
be injured by the negligent act of the insured.
Courts have also pointed out 49 that insurance, unlike any other asset

of the defendant, exists for the sole purpose of satisfying claims
arising by injury to third persons due to the defendant's negligence;
allowing its discovery is not being unsympathetic to the doctrine of
not revealing personal assets.
The sound reasons advanced by courts allowing discovery, the
practical considerations of facilitating private settlement, and the
relieving of congested dockets all assure the "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action" pursuant to the policy of
the rules."' The New Mexico courts are not restrained by precedent
which denies discovery of liability insurance, and by adopting this
sound procedural tool the New Mexico courts can more effectively
administer their growing dockets. The benefit of allowing discovery
of liability insurance to the individual litigants is the opportunity to
candidly appraise the real value of their claims and defenses. This
should aid in effectuating a prompt and just disposition of their
litigation.
Richard B. Cole

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Johanek v. Aberle, supra note 44, at 278.
E.g., Jeppesen v. Swanson, 242 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d 649 (1955).
E.g., Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W. 2d 939 (Ky. 1961).
Id. at 942.
E.g., People v. Fisher, 12 11. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

